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ABSTRACT
The prevalence of antisocial behavior varies across time and place. The likelihood
of committing such behavior is affected by, and also affects, the local social environ-
ment. To further our understanding of this dynamic process, we conducted two stud-
ies of antisocial behavior, punishment, and social norms. These studies took place
in two neighborhoods in Newcastle Upon Tyne, England. According to a previous
study, Neighborhood A enjoys relatively low frequencies of antisocial behavior and
crime and high levels of social capital. In contrast, Neighborhood B is characterized
by relatively high frequencies of antisocial behavior and crime and low levels of social
capital. In Study 1, we used an economic game to assess neighborhood differences
in theft, third-party punishment (3PP) of theft, and expectation of 3PP. Participants
also reported their perceived neighborhood frequency of cooperative norm vio-
lation (“cheating”). Participants in Neighborhood B thought that their neighbors
commonly cheat but did not condone cheating. They stole more money from their
neighbors in the game, and were less punitive of those who did, than the residents of
Neighborhood A. Perceived cheating was positively associated with theft, negatively
associated with the expectation of 3PP, and central to the neighborhood difference.
Lower trust in one’s neighbors and a greater subjective value of the monetary cost of
punishment contributed to the reduced punishment observed in Neighborhood B. In
Study 2, we examined the causality of cooperative norm violation on expectation of
3PP with a norms manipulation. Residents in Neighborhood B who were informed
that cheating is locally uncommon were more expectant of 3PP. In sum, our results
provide support for three potentially simultaneous positive feedback mechanisms by
which the perception that others are behaving antisocially can lead to further anti-
social behavior: (1) motivation to avoid being suckered, (2) decreased punishment
of antisocial behavior, and (3) decreased expectation of punishment of antisocial
behavior. Consideration of these mechanisms and of norm psychology will help us to
understand how neighborhoods can descend into an antisocial culture and get stuck
there.
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Keywords Social disorganization theory, Cooperation, Descriptive norms, Injunctive norms,
Social capital, Cultural evolution
How to cite this article Schroeder et al. (2014), Local norms of cheating and the cultural evolution of crime and punishment: a study of
two urban neighborhoods. PeerJ 2:e450; DOI 10.7717/peerj.450
INTRODUCTION
Why do humans behave antisocially? The converse of this question—why humans behave
prosocially—has been studied extensively by experimental economists, and determinants
of prosocial behavior may be mirror images of determinants of antisocial behavior. One
proximate explanation for prosocial behavior is punishment; i.e., people will behave
prosocially if not doing so results in punishment. Empirical evidence for this comes
from economic games. Using a repeated public goods game, Yamagishi (1986) and Fehr
& Ga¨chter (2000) showed that the opportunity for players to fine each other on the basis
of contribution behavior can stabilize contributions to the public good at a high level.
Following this, the cross-cultural covariation of prosocial behavior and punishment has
received substantial interest (Henrich et al., 2006; Herrmann, Tho¨ni & Ga¨chter, 2008).
Considerable local variation in prosociality has also been observed (Wilson, O’Brien &
Sesma, 2009; Nettle, Colle´ony & Cockerill, 2011; Lamba & Mace, 2011), yet the question of
whether prosocial behavior and punishment positively covary at the local level has spurred
little research among experimental economists (but see Kocher, Martinsson & Visser, 2012).
However, the related question of whether antisocial behavior and a lack of punishment
positively covary at the neighborhood level has generated substantial research within
the field of sociology. Social disorganization theory posits that poverty, residential
mobility, and family disruption can diminish the capacity a community has for creating
relationships and establishing shared social norms. This low level of ‘social capital’ can
lead to increased crime and delinquency via reduced collective action (Shaw & McKay,
1942; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993a; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993b;
Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997). Without trust and shared behavioral expectations,
residents have decreased capacity to enforce desirable behavior through informal social
control (i.e., informal surveillance and/or intervention by residents) (Sampson, Morenoff&
Gannon-Rowley, 2002).
Of interest to researchers in both of these fields is how the local social environment
can evolve over time to become more prosocial or more antisocial. This requires an
understanding of the dynamic relationship between individual decisions (as typically
studied by experimental economists) and the local social environment (as typically
studied by sociologists). That is, individual decisions can be influenced by empirical
expectations of the behavior of others in the local social environment (Bichierri & Xiao,
2009). These decisions, as manifest in observable behavior, then become part of the local
social environment. Others will form expectations on the basis of their perception of the
local environment and possibly alter their own behavior. That such a dynamic relationship
exists is suggested by, for example, the interdependence of individual decisions to commit
crimes (Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman, 1996).
In this paper, we attempt to bridge these two approaches of experimental economics and
sociology and increase our understanding of the dynamic relationship between individual
decisions and the social environment. We do so through consideration of the role of the
individual’s expectation of others’ cooperative behavior—that is, the role of perceived
local norms of cooperative behavior. Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren (1990) distinguish between
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injunctive norms and descriptive norms. Injunctive norms convey how people should be-
have. Descriptive norms, on the other hand, illustrate how most people actually do behave.
It is readily apparent that cooperative descriptive norms should be informative as to
people’s expectation of cooperation. However, cooperative descriptive norms may also
be informative as to people’s expectation of punishment for cooperative norm violation
or antisocial behavior, particularly when there is a mismatch between injunctive and
descriptive norms. A lack of alignment between injunctive and descriptive cooperative
norms is implicit in broken windows theory—the idea that signs of social and physical
disorder invite criminal behavior—in part because disorder is a cue that social control is
lax (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). This mechanism for the ‘spread of disorder’ was elegantly
tested by Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg (2008), who created public spaces in which an explicit
injunctive norm was violated—e.g., a littered space (conveying a descriptive norm) next
to a sign telling people not to litter (injunctive norm)—thereby communicating a lack of
adherence to the injunctive norm and experimentally inducing further antisocial behavior.
These results suggest that signs that others are flouting injunctive cooperative norms may
serve as cues that antisocial behavior will not be punished. However, this remains a largely
untested explanation of these results and of the broken windows effect in general (Traxler &
Winter, 2012; but see Lochner, 2007).
Important to the studies we present in this paper, the work of Keizer, Lindenberg
& Steg (2008) and Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg (2013) also demonstrated the possibility
for ‘cross-norm effects’—that is, the focus of the injunctive and descriptive norms was
different from the behavioral outcome assessed by the researchers. Some of the observed
cross-norm effects included public versus private goods. For example, graffiti and litter
(destruction of a public good) each resulted in an increase in theft of an envelope with
money in it (Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg, 2008). In another set of experiments, these same
authors also demonstrated cross-norm effects for the restoration of a public good and
prosocial behavior targeted at an individual; garbage bags on the street—in violation of
city ordinance—resulted in a decrease in posting of a letter dropped next to a postbox
(Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg, 2013).
Thus, studying injunctive and descriptive cooperative norms presents a way to assess
individual perceptions of environmental variation in cooperative and, potentially, punitive
behavior. It also offers a way to study how the social environment affects the behavior of the
individual and individual’s behavior in turn affects the social environment, by conveying
information about descriptive norms. It is particularly appropriate when the focus is on
local (rather than large-scale) variation in prosocial or antisocial behavior, as injunctive
norms may be more similar in areas where people share common culture and history,
while descriptive norms may still vary. Given a general consensus on injunctive norms, the
emphasis can then be on perceived deviation from the injunctive norms.
The studies
Our studies were set in two nearby neighborhoods in Newcastle Upon Tyne, England,
that we expected to have similar injunctive cooperative norms based on a shared
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cultural history. These two neighborhoods are similar in size, physical layout, and ethnic
composition yet differ dramatically in rates of antisocial behavior and socioeconomic
deprivation. While Neighborhood A is relatively affluent, Neighborhood B has experienced
high rates of unemployment, physical decay, massive depopulation, and crime, following
the collapse of mining and shipbuilding industries (see Nettle, Colle´ony & Cockerill, 2011
and citations therein). In an earlier study, Nettle, Colle´ony & Cockerill (2011) used surveys,
a Dictator Game, behavioral observation, and field experiments to reveal substantially less
antisocial behavior, more social capital, and more prosocial behavior in Neighborhood A
than B.
Here, we return to these neighborhoods to investigate whether individual decisions
to engage in antisocial behavior and norm enforcement vary by neighborhood. To do
so, we evaluated antisocial behavior, punishment, and expectation of punishment in an
economic game. We used a questionnaire to investigate whether neighborhood differences
in antisocial behavior, punishment, and expectation of punishment could be explained
by neighborhood differences in trust and local descriptive cooperative norms. Study
1 was observational and aimed to document and explain differences in perceptions
and behaviors between the neighborhoods. Study 2 introduced a novel experimental
methodology to manipulate perceived injunctive norm adherence, allowing us to make
causal inferences. We assessed whether information on injunctive cooperative norm
adherence altered expectations of punishment for antisocial behavior.
STUDY 1
Camerer & Fehr (2004) suggest that a real-world example of a third-party punishment
game (3PP game) (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004) is scolding of a neighbor for treating
another person unacceptably. In this study, we administered a 3PP game along with a
questionnaire (see Supplemental Information). Our variant of the game, which was played
among residents within each neighborhood, enabled us to study differences between the
neighborhoods in antisocial behavior and punishment for antisocial behavior. Player 1 was
given the opportunity to steal from Player 2. Player 3 was given the opportunity to fine
Player 1 if she took money from Player 2. Player 2 indicated whether she thought Player 3
would fine Player 1 if Player 1 took half of Player 2’s money.
We used Player 1 and Player 2 decisions to assess whether residents of Neighborhood
B were (1) more likely to behave antisocially and (2) less likely to expect someone in their
neighborhood to intervene in antisocial behavior. In conjunction with the questionnaire,
we also used Player 1 and 2 decisions to investigate (3) whether perceived local cooperative
norm violation could explain the the hypothesized neighborhood differences in individual
antisocial decisions and (4) punitive expectations.
We used Player 3 game decisions and the questionnaire to assess (1) whether residents of
Neighborhood A were more willing than those of B to punish antisocial behavior in their
neighborhood, and (2) whether, following social disorganization theory, neighborhood
trust could explain the hypothesized relationship between neighborhood and punitive
behavior.
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Study 1 methods
Sampling
The Ethics Committee of the Newcastle University Faculty of Medical Sciences approved
the study protocol (Protocol #00503/2011 and Amendment #00503 1/2012). Written
consent was not obtained because it would have been the only record of participation. We
conducted the study from July 2012 to December 2012. A maximum of one participant
per household was drawn from the electoral roll. Potential participants received a
hand-delivered envelope with a cover letter describing the study, packet (questionnaire,
explanation of the game, and game), and stamped return envelope. A minority of
envelopes were delivered by subjects in another study (Nettle et al., 2014). We avoided
sampling adjacent households and households sampled by Nettle, Colle´ony & Cockerill
(2011).
Questionnaire
From the questionnaire, we recorded each participant’s age and sex.
Trust. We asked individuals how much they trust people in their neighborhood, on a
10-point scale (10=most trusting).
Civic norms: condoned and perceived cheating. We asked individuals about both injunctive
and descriptive civic norms (Supplemental Information). For the injunctive norms, we
described three behaviors and asked whether it is Never OK to do this behavior, Always
OK, or somewhere in between. Answers were constrained to a 10-point scale (1= ‘Always
OK’ and 10 = ‘Never OK’). The behaviors were (1) cheating the benefits system,
(2) avoiding a fare on public transport, and (3) cheating on taxes. Condoned cheating is the
average across behaviors. Larger values indicate that cheating on public goods is condoned.
Note that condoned cheating is similar to the ‘norms of civic cooperation’ (Knack & Keefer,
1997; Herrmann, Tho¨ni & Ga¨chter, 2008) derived from the World Values Survey.
For the descriptive norms, we asked individuals whether they think many people in their
neighborhood would do these behaviors (1= ‘No one would’ and 10= ‘Everyone would’).
We averaged across these responses to arrive at perceived cheating. Larger values indicate
that neighborhood cheating on public goods is perceived as more common.
We note that the cooperative norms used in the questionnaire pertain to public
goods, while the possibility for antisocial behavior in the game is directed at a single
person. However, as mentioned in the introduction, previous studies have experimentally
demonstrated ‘cross-norm effects’ wherein destruction or restoration of a public good
induced antisocial or prosocial behavior, respectively, directed at a single individual
(Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg, 2008; Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg, 2013).
The 3PP game
Participants read instructions for the game, which followed the questionnaire, and then
worked through examples (see Supplemental Information). (From this, we had responses
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to six test questions.) They were told that after receiving the packet in the post, we would
determine the game outcome and then deliver their cash payoff along with a £5 payment
for completing the survey.
The game worked as follows: all three players received an initial allocation of £10, to
be paid after the decisions of all three players had been submitted. Player 1 had to decide
how many pounds (integer from 0 to 10) to take from Player 2. If Player 1 took money
from Player 2, Player 3 had to decide whether to fine Player 1. We used the strategy method
for Player 3. Player 3 had to decide, for each amount greater than 0 that Player 1 could
take, whether to pay to fine Player 1. Therefore, Player 3 had to make 10 choices, each
corresponding to an amount that Player 1 might take from Player 2. The cost of the fine
to Players 1 and 3 was constant (Player 3 paid £2 to make Player 1 lose £6). Player 2 could
not make a choice in the game. We asked Player 2 to indicate whether she thought Player 3
would fine Player 1 if she took £5 from her (Supplemental Information).
Game behaviors are thus: theft (an integer from 0 to 10 representing the amount of
money Player 1 took from Player 2), expect 3PP (whether Player 2 expected Player 3 to
punish Player 1 if she took £5), and punitiveness (an integer from 0 to 10; this is the total
number of potential thefts, from £1–£10, that Player 3 would punish).
Subjective value of money
We expected the subjective value of money to differ between neighborhoods and impact
game behavior. Therefore, following the game, we asked how much of a difference, on a
scale of one to 10, an amount of money x would make to their weekly budget, where x
was £1 for Player 1 (value £1) and £2 for Players 2 and 3 (value £2). After commencement
of data collection, we revised the packets for Player 1 to include x = £10. Thus, for some
Player 1s we also have value £10.
Statistical analyses
The majority of responses can be considered discrete ordered choices. Thus, to assess
neighborhood differences in game behavior, trust, cooperative norms, and the value of
money, we analyzed the data with ordered logistic regression. The exception to this is game
behavior for Player 2, for which we used binary logistic regression. We compared the fit of
different models with the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974). Ordered and
binomial logistic regression analyses and plotted predictions (i.e., the predicted value based
on the fitted model and the data used to fit the model) were produced in the R statistical
and computing environment (R Core Team, 2012) with the following packages: MASS
(Venables & Ripley, 2002), rethinking (McElreath, 2012), beeswarm (Ecklund, 2012), and
ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009). Note that plotted predictions for theft and punitiveness are both
(0, 8). For each of these game behaviors, two possible values were not observed (3 and 8
for theft, 2 and 9 for punitiveness); thus, for prediction we condensed the ranges. We report
Odds Ratios (ORs) for a unit increase in the outcome for each unit increase of the predictor
variable, accompanied by 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1 Key variables from Study 1 by neighborhood. Columns one and two contain medians for
Neighborhood A and Neighborhood B, respectively (median absolute deviation in parentheses). Col-
umn three contains the odds that a participant from Neighborhood B indicated a higher value (95%
confidence interval in parentheses). Condoned cheating and perceived cheating are the mean of the three
injunctive and descriptive norms, respectively.
Variable Median A (scale 1 to 10) Median B (scale 1 to 10) Odds B higher
Trust neighbors 8 (1) 5 (2) 0.053 (0.031, 0.093)
Value £1 1 (0) 1 (0) 1.89 (0.77, 4.61)
Value £2 1 (0) 2.5 (1.5) 5.53 (2.51, 12.18)
Value £10 3 (1) 5 (3) 3.37 (1.04, 10.9)
Injunctive avoid fare 1 (0) 1 (0) 0.84 (0.52, 1.35)
Injunctive cheat benefits 1 (0) 1 (0) 1.43 (0.87, 2.34)
Injunctive cheat tax 1 (0) 1 (0) 1.38 (0.84, 2.23)
Descriptive avoid fare 3 (1) 6 (2) 11.02 (6.58, 18.46)
Descriptive cheat benefits 3 (1) 6 (2) 13.95 (8.16, 23.85)
Descriptive cheat tax 4 (1) 5 (2) 3.06 (1.95, 4.79)
Condoned cheating 1.33 (0.33) 1.50 (0.50) 1.25 (0.80, 1.95)
Perceived cheating 3.00 (0.67) 5.50 (1.83) 10.22 (6.18, 16.90)
Study 1 results
Participants
We achieved sample sizes of 40 (16 male), 44 (22 male), and 49 (23 male) for Players 1, 2,
and 3, respectively, in Neighborhood A and 34 (12 male), 43 (23 male), and 50 (23 male)
in B (Table S1). Every week, new players from each neighborhood were combined into
triads, and we determined game outcome from their decisions. For incomplete triads,
players were drawn at random from all previous neighborhood players. We delivered to
participants: the game outcome, debriefing sheet, money received from the game, and £5
for participating. The mean payoff from the game is £9.26 (σ = £3.49) in Neighborhood A
and £9.16 in B (σ = £4.13). Descriptive statistics and neighborhood comparisons for key
variables are in Table 1. We also report descriptive statistics in the text to assist the reader.
Trust
Participants in Neighborhood A indicated far higher trust neighbors (median 8 on a scale of
1:10, median absolute deviation (MAD) 1) than did participants in B (median 5, MAD 2)
(Table 1) (OR 18.8, 95% CI [10.8–32.8]).
Punishment of antisocial behavior
As predicted, participants in Neighborhood A were more punitive than those in B
(Fig. 1) (OR 3.3, 95% CI [1.6–7.0]). Median punitiveness is 6 (MAD 4) and 3 (MAD 3)
for Neighborhoods A and B, respectively. Thus, more participants in Neighborhood A
indicated that they would pay £2 to fine Player 1 for a greater number of potential thefts.
The subjective cost of punishment in the game, value £2, had a negative effect upon
punitiveness (OR 0.7, 95% CI [0.6–0.9]) and was larger for participants in Neighborhood B
than A (Table 1). However, participants in Neighborhood A were still more punitive than
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Figure 1 Player 3 behavior, punitiveness, by neighborhood. Each diamond represents one observation.
those in B when we include value £2 in the model (OR 2.1, 95% CI [0.9–4.6]). This result
is robust to the inclusion of additional covariates age, male, and test questions (OR 2.9, 95%
CI [1.2–7.2]).
Based on social disorganization theory, we hypothesized that greater trust among
residents of Neighborhood A would partially explain the increased willingness of residents
to engage in 3PP of antisocial behavior. Individuals who reported greater trust neighbors
were slightly more punitive (OR 1.15, 95% CI [0.99–1.32]). The relationship between trust
and punitiveness is less robust to the inclusion of value £2 (OR 1.09, 95% CI [0.94–1.27]);
however, including an interaction between value £2 and trust neighbors improves model fit
(AIC of 380.13 compared to 384.49).
Predictions from this model including the interaction are shown in Fig. 2. Value £2
still has a negative effect on punitiveness, but the slope is steeper for participants with
high trust neighbors. Thus, participants with high trust neighbors are more punitive than
those with low trust neighbors when value £2 is small, but less punitive when it is large.
Neighborhood is no longer a reliable predictor of punitiveness when the interaction is
included in the model (OR 1.8, 95% CI [0.7, 5.7]), nor does model fit improve with the
addition of neighborhood (AIC= 380.67).
Civic norms: condoned and perceived cheating
In both neighborhoods, most participants indicated that it is not acceptable to cheat
on public goods. We observed little variation in injunctive norms across cooperative
behaviors (Table 1). Nor did we detect a clear difference between neighborhoods with
respect to specific injunctive norms or condoned cheating (i.e., the within-participant mean
of injunctive norms) (Fig. 3, Table 1).
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Figure 2 Punitiveness modeled as an interaction between trust neighbors and value £2. Blue is ‘high
trust’ (8; median trust neighbors score for Neighborhood A). Orange is ‘low trust’ (5; median trust
neighbors score for Neighborhood B). Dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3 Neighborhoodmeans and standard errors for condoned cheating and perceived cheating. For
condoned cheating: 1, Never OK; 10, Always OK; and for perceived cheating, 1, No one would; 10, Everyone
would.
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However, there was a dramatic difference between neighborhoods with respect to
perceived cheating. Participants in Neighborhood B indicated that more of their neighbors
would cheat on a public good than those in A (median 3.00, MAD 0.67 for A; median 5.50,
MAD 1.83 for B) (Fig. 3, Table 1). Participants who thought more of their neighbors cheat
on public goods were also less trusting of their neighbors (OR 0.54, 95% CI [0.48–0.62]).
Juxtaposition of condoned cheating and perceived cheating reveals that although
participants in Neighborhood B tended to state that many of their neighbors cheat on
public goods, we lack strong evidence that they view this behavior as more acceptable
than those in A. This fits with our prior expectation that injunctive cooperative norms
would be similar in Neighborhoods A and B. We therefore use perceived cheating as a
within-participant measure of perceived local cooperative norm violation, or deviation
from the injunctive cooperative norm.
Antisocial behavior
Participants in Neighborhood B took more from their neighbors in the game. Theft is also
more variable in Neighborhood B than A. The median value of theft is 5 in Neighborhood
B (MAD 5), compared to 0 in A (MAD 0) (odds that theft is greater in Neighborhood B:
OR 2.9, 95% CI [1.2–7.1]). The neighborhood difference in theft is robust to the inclusion
of age, male, and value £1 (OR 2.8, 95% [2.5–6.9]). For the reduced dataset for which
we had data on value £10 (40 participants, 23 from Neighborhood A), substituting this
variable in the model increases the odds that a participant in B stole more in the game
(OR 4.1, 95% CI [0.9–17.5]). Inclusion of test questions in the model reduces confidence
in the neighborhood difference in theft (OR 2.1, 95% [0.8–5.8]). However, incomplete
test questions are heavily patterned for Player 1; only participants in Neighborhood
B for whom theft > 0 did not complete the questions. Irrespective of the participant’s
comprehension of the entire game, the opportunity for Player 1 to behave antisocially (the
outcome of interest to us) should be very clear from the packet (i.e., “How many pounds do
you choose to take from Player B?”) (Supplemental Information).
As expected, perceived cheating is a robust predictor of theft, even controlling for value
£1 (Fig. 4; OR 1.3, 95% CI [1.0–1.6]). When both neighborhood and perceived cheating are
considered in the same model, neither is a reliable predictor of theft. Nor does AIC offer
strong support for a single model (235.40 for the model with perceived cheating, 234.67
for neighborhood, and 234.60 for perceived cheating + neighborhood). This suggests that to
understand the greater theft in Neighborhood B, we need to consider perceived cheating.
Expectation of 3PP
We asked Player 2 whether she thought Player 3 would fine Player 1 if Player 1 took £5 from
her (expect 3PP). Contrary to our expectations, neighborhood was not a reliable predictor
of expect 3PP. Of participants in Neighborhood A, 36.36% expected 3PP, compared to
30.23% of participants from Neighborhood B (OR 1.2, 95% CI [0.5–3.2]). However, as
predicted, we did observe a negative relationship between perceived cheating and expect
3PP (Fig. 5; OR 0.8, 95% CI [0.6–1]). This relationship does not change with inclusion of
value £2 as a proxy for the local subjective value of £2 (OR 0.8, 95% CI [0.6–1]).
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Figure 4 Theft for Player 1 modeled as dependent on perceived cheating. Dotted lines are 95% con-
fidence intervals. Bubbles represent the actual data from Neighborhood A (blue) and Neighborhood B
(orange). Size of the bubble corresponds to the number of observations.
Figure 5 Probability of expect 3PP dependent on perceived cheating. Dotted lines are 95% confidence
intervals.
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Study 1 summary and discussion
Study 1 reveals that individual perceptions of local cooperative descriptive norms
(i.e., perceived cheating) vary dramatically by neighborhood, in concordance with previous
observations of neighborhood discrepancies in antisocial behavior (including crime),
prosocial behavior, and social capital (Nettle, Colle´ony & Cockerill, 2011). Participants in
Neighborhood B were far more likely than those in A to think that more of their neighbors
behave uncooperatively. We could not, however, attribute this to a neighborhood
difference in injunctive cooperative norms. Thus, a perceived lack of adherence to
injunctive cooperative norms was pervasive in Neighborhood B.
This general perception in Neighborhood B that others are behaving antisocially
appears justifiable: participants in Neighborhood B stole more money in the game.
However, the results of our analyses suggest that this neighborhood difference in theft in
the game can be explained by neighborhood differences in descriptive cooperative norms.
That is, individuals who perceived cheating to be common were more likely to steal, and
stole more in the game. These individuals tended to reside in Neighborhood B. Thus, the
perception that others in the community are cheating may have induced further antisocial
behavior in the game. While this observation is purely correlational, it is in accordance
with the experimental results of Falk & Fischbacher (2002), who demonstrated a positive
effect of observed theft on a participant’s subsequent choice to steal in the lab. It is also
in agreement with those of Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren (1990) and Keizer, Lindenberg &
Steg (2008), who showed that observed norm violation can result in an increase in norm
violation.
Correspondingly, participants in Neighborhood B indicated far less trust in their
neighbors than did those in A. This result fits with the far lower self-reported social capital
in Neighborhood B previously observed. Our measure of trust in the current study, trust
neighbors, approximates one of six items in the social capital index of Nettle, Colle´ony
& Cockerill (2011), which was highly positively correlated with the overall index (0.77,
p-value< 0.05).
As expected, and in concordance with social disorganization theory, trust neighbors was
a positive predictor of punitiveness. Kocher, Martinsson & Visser (2012) similarly found
that trust in members of a participant pool was positively correlated with punitiveness in
a public goods game. Although they interpreted this outcome as stemming from greater
disappointment in free-riding behavior, they suggest it merits further investigation of the
role of social capital in norm enforcement.
One possible interpretation of the unpredicted interaction we observed between trust
neighbors and value £2 lies in consideration of the multiple ways in which the cost of
punishing can vary for the punisher. We showed that participants were more punitive
when value £2 was smaller. Punitiveness is also less costly when there are fewer defectors
and/or more punishers (Boyd et al., 2003, Gu¨rerk, Irlenbusch & Rockenbach, 2006; Boyd,
Gintis & Bowles, 2010). Trust neighbors may be informative as to whether Player 3 thinks
there are many punishers and defectors in her neighborhood and thus construed as a
measurement of the cost of intervening in antisocial behavior. From this perspective,
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our results are consistent with the idea that people are more punitive when punishment
is cheap—with respect to both material resources and the behavior of others. This also
highlights a limitation of this study, which is that Player 3 was able to punish anonymously
and therefore ‘cheaply’ with respect to possible retribution. In the real world, third-party
punishment may be associated with risk of retribution or other costs that are not captured
by the £2 Player 3 paid to exact punishment. Decreased resiliency to retribution could also
vary by neighborhood, perhaps partly as a result of differing material resources.
We are unable to determine whether participants in Neighborhood B stole more money
than those in Neighborhood A because they thought punishment was less likely. This is
because a participant’s motivation to steal a particular amount of money can be ascribed
to inequity aversion as well as the expected probability of punishment. However, our data
from Player 2 address expectation of punishment. While we did not observe a robust
neighborhood difference in expect 3PP, we did observe a strong negative relationship
between perceived cheating and expect 3PP. That is, a participant who thought many of
her neighbors cheat on public goods was less likely to expect a neighbor to pay £2 to fine
Player 1 if Player 1 took half her money.
This result supports the idea that descriptive cooperative norms are indeed informative
as to expectation of punishment (Traxler & Winter, 2012). It also suggests that expectation
of punishment is one of the mechanisms by which signs of norm violation can lead
to further violation (Traxler & Winter, 2012; Kelling & Wilson, 1982). However, the
causality of the observed relationship between perceived cheating and expect 3PP remains
unknown. Surveys of the kind in Study 1 can only establish correlation; examining the
causal significance of one variable for another requires experimental manipulation of
the first variable. With this in mind, we undertook Study 2, in which we used selective
feedback from Study 1 to experimentally alter perceptions of perceived cheating in the two
neighborhoods.
STUDY 2
Feedback on or manipulation of descriptive norms has been used to alter people’s
behavior—in diverse domains from littering (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990) to energy
use (Nolan et al., 2008). In Study 2, we used a novel method for manipulation of descriptive
norms to investigate the causality of the relationship between perceived cheating and expect
3PP. In each neighborhood, we provided novice Player 2s with information on what their
neighbors thought about the descriptive cooperative norms of the neighborhood (‘Norms
treatment’). We manipulated this information so as to present Study 2 participants from
Neighborhood A with a less positive picture of descriptive norms than was really the case,
and participants from Neighborhood B with a more positive picture. We predicted that
participants in Neighborhood A who received the Norms treatment would be less likely
to expect Player 3 to 3PP on their behalf, compared to those participants in the same
neighborhood who did not receive the treatment. We predicted the opposite effect in
Neighborhood B.
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Study 2 methods
Sampling
We collected data for Study 2 from October to December 2012, while Study 1 was ongoing
(Supplemental Information), following the same protocol as in Study 1.
Norms questionnaire
We refer to the questionnaire used in Study 1 as ‘Baseline treatment’. The questionnaire for
the Norms treatment differed as follows.
Civic norms manipulation: perceived cheating. The Norms questionnaire did not include
questions about injunctive and descriptive norms. We presented participants with
information on the responses of a subset of Study 1 participants in their neighborhood
to the questions about descriptive civic norms (Supplemental Information).
The following backstory was used: as a part of the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project,
we had asked 10 people in their neighborhood how common they think avoiding a
public transport fare, cheating the benefits system, and cheating on taxes, are in that
neighborhood. We averaged these answers to get an idea of how common people think
certain behaviors are. We wanted to know what other people in the neighborhood thought
of these answers, and thus were asking them (Supplemental Information).
We presented one scale for each of the behaviors. The information in each scale was
manipulated: in Neighborhood A, we took the mean of the 10 responses that gave the least
favorable impression of cheating (i.e., high perceived cheating), and in Neighborhood B,
we took the mean of the 10 responses that gave the most favorable impression of cheating
(i.e., low perceived cheating). The information presented for Neighborhood A was: 5.7
for avoid a fare on public transport, 5.5 for cheat the benefits system, and 6.7 for cheat
taxes (where 1 = ‘No one would’ and 10 = ‘Everyone would’). In Neighborhood B the
information presented was: 2.2 for avoid a fare, 2.3 for cheat benefits, and 1.7 for cheat
taxes. Beneath each scale, Study 2 participants were asked to circle ‘Fewer people would do
this’, ‘This is about right’, or ‘More people would do this’ (Supplemental Information).
Contamination. To assess whether participants knew Study 1 participants, we included a
contamination question: ‘Do you know of other people in your neighborhood who got a
questionnaire and plan to post it or already have posted it?’ (‘Yes’, ‘Not sure’, or ‘No’).
3PP game
For Study 2, we measured the following behavior: expect 3PP (yes or no; representing
whether Player 2 expected Player 3 to punish Player 1 if Player 1 took £5 from her).
Statistical analyses
We used binary logistic regression to assess the effect of the Norms treatment on expect 3PP
within each neighborhood.
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Figure 6 Proportion of Player 2s, by neighborhood and treatment, who indicated that they expect
Player 3 to 3PP on their behalf.
Study 2 results
Participants
For Study 2, we sampled 41 participants from Neighborhood A (21 male) and 39
participants from B (16 male) (Table S2).
Reaction to normative information
Participants in Neighborhood B were far more likely than those in A to indicate ‘This is
about right’ when presented with the manipulated norms scales for cheat benefits and avoid
fare (OR 3.63, 95% CI [1.23–10.70] and OR 3.74, 95% CI [1.34–10.49], respectively). In
Neighborhood B, 38.46%, 43.59%, and 46.15% of participants indicated ‘This is about
right’ for cheat benefits, avoid fare, and cheat taxes, respectively. In contrast, the majority of
participants in Neighborhood A indicated ‘Fewer people would do this’ when presented
with the manipulated scales for cheat benefits and avoid fare (78.05% of participants for
each behavior). Only 51.28% of participants in Neighborhood A indicated ‘Fewer people
would do this’ for cheat taxes.
Expectation of 3PP: norms treatment
Participants in Neighborhood B who received the Norms treatment—i.e., who received
information that their neighbors perceive cheating to be uncommon—were more likely to
expect Player 3 to 3PP on their behalf, compared to those in B who received the Baseline
treatment. The proportion of participants who expected 3PP is 58.97% for the Norms
treatment, compared to 30.23% for Baseline (OR 3.32, 95% CI [1.33–8.25]; Fig. 6).
Exclusion of participants for whom contamination was ‘Not sure’ (five) or ‘Yes’ (two)
does not qualitatively change the results. (One participant circled both.)
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We did not observe a robust effect of the Norms treatment on expect 3PP in Neighbor-
hood A. Contrary to our prediction, the proportion of participants in A who expected 3PP
is 41.46% for Norms treatment, compared to 36.36% for Baseline treatment (OR 1.24, 95%
CI [0.52–3.00]; Fig. 6).
However, the Norms treatment generated an unanticipated response in Neighborhood
A. Some participants attempted to redirect their money by asking us to: donate it to charity
(three participants), keep it for research/university funds (two participants), or not pay
them (one participant). The rate of ‘opting out of payment’ is 14.63% for Norms treatment
participants in Neighborhood A, compared to 1.15% of Baseline participants in A (OR
11.25, 95% CI [2.18–57.97]). This spontaneous change in game play was not observed in
Neighborhood B.
Study 2 summary and discussion
In Study 2, participants in Neighborhood B received information that their neighbors
think there is little cheating on public goods in their neighborhood, relative to what we
actually observed in Study 1. They were far more likely to expect a neighbor to punish
antisocial behavior compared to those in Neighborhood B who did not receive the
manipulation. Whether disorder can play a causal role in an increase in crime rates
(Kelling & Wilson, 1982) has been debated (Sampson, Morenoff & Gannon-Rowley, 2002;
Markowitz et al., 2001). Our results provide empirical evidence of a mechanism by which
norm violation can lead to the further violation of a different norm—through change in
the expectation of punishment.
There are at least three plausible routes by which this effect is achieved. One possibility
is that people expect cooperators to be more likely than non-cooperators to punish. The
second is that people perceive other’s behavior to reflect other’s expectation of punishment.
That is, people think that others are not behaving antisocially because of their expectations
of punishment for behaving antisocially. The third possibility, closely related to the
second, is that if antisocial behavior is very common, people may intuit that it persists
because antisocial behavior is going unpunished and thus have a decreased expectation of
punishment.
We did not observe a reliable negative effect of the norms manipulation on expectation
of 3PP in Neighborhood A. It is not clear why we observed the expected result in Neigh-
borhood B and not Neighborhood A. In Study 1, we found greater variation in trust and
norms in Neighborhood B than in Neighborhood A (Table 1). One interpretation of this
is that the environment is more heterogeneous and unpredictable in Neighborhood B. If
so, perhaps residents of Neighborhood B are less certain than residents of Neighborhood A
of the behavior of their neighbors and therefore were more accepting of the manipulation.
Indeed, far more Neighborhood B participants circled ‘This is about right’ when presented
with the manipulated descriptive norms. Another possibility is that participants in
Neighborhood B were more accepting of the information provided by an authority figure
(university personnel/scientist).
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this paper was to consider how the local social environment affects individual
decisions to engage in and sanction antisocial behavior, and how an individual’s antisocial
behavior can in turn affect the local social environment, by conveying information about
descriptive norms. In Study 1, we observed that subjects in Neighborhood B took more
money from their neighbors and were less punitive in an economic game of crime and
punishment. The perception that others are cheating on public goods varied dramatically
by neighborhood, was fundamental to the neighborhood difference in theft in the game,
and was negatively associated with the expectation of third party punishment for antisocial
behavior. Subjects in Neighborhood B were also less punitive of antisocial behavior, and
punitiveness was negatively associated with trust in one’s neighbors.
In Study 2, we showed that providing participants in Neighborhood B with information
that cheating is perceived as uncommon within their neighborhood led to a sharp increase
in the expectation of third-party punishment for theft. An increase in the perceived
likelihood of punishment would presumably lead to greater cooperation, given the close
relationship between these two variables. Thus, these results provide novel empirical
support for a mechanism by which cues of norm violation can lead to further norm
violation (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990; Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg, 2008): altered
expectation of punishment (Kelling & Wilson, 1982; Traxler & Winter, 2012).
We consider these results within a framework where culture is dynamic, subject to
evolutionary processes that can lead to more or less cooperative outcomes (Boyd &
Richerson, 1985). Unlike in recent cross-cultural studies of cooperation and punishment
(Henrich et al., 2006; Herrmann, Tho¨ni & Ga¨chter, 2008), our two study populations
share many cultural components, including the institutions that formally sanction
their civic violations (although how those institutions are experienced may vary) and
injunctive cooperative norms. The apparently large discrepancy between desired and
achieved cooperative outcomes in Neighborhood B, as assessed with injunctive and
descriptive cooperative norms, adds a new perspective on the cultural evolution of variable
cooperative outcomes.
Our results provide evidence for three potential routes by which perceived cooperative
norm violation can lead to further violation of cooperative norms.1 All of these processes
1 Our studies focused on cooperative
norm violation (“perceived cheating”)
and a very specific type of antisocial
behavior (theft). However, based on
work on cross-norm effects referenced
in the introduction, we think that we
can draw inferences here not just about
theft but cooperative norm violation in
general.
have been postulated or investigated by others; however, to our knowledge, they have not
been considered simultaneously as processes that may, in concert, lead to substantial
cultural change. These positive feedback processes are: (1) To avoid being ‘suckered’,
conditional cooperators are motivated to defect if they perceive that defection is common
(Fischbacher, Ga¨chter & Fehr, 2001; Falk & Fischbacher, 2002; Bichierri & Xiao, 2009;
Raihani & Hart, 2010; Irwin & Simpson, 2013). (2) Perceived cheating leads to lower
trust. Low trust results in reduced informal punishment of norm violation (Kocher,
Martinsson & Visser, 2012). In this vein, Traxler & Winter (2012) observe a direct effect
of the perceived frequency of norm violations on expressed willingness to sanction
violations. Similarly, extensions of social disorganization theory include feedback
processes between crime/disorder and social cohesion/control, via fear or residential
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instability (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Markowitz et al., 2001; Steenbeck & Hipp, 2011).
(3) When the perceived frequency of cooperative norm violation is high, expectation of
punishment for violation is lower (Sah, 1991; Traxler & Winter, 2012).
We hypothesize that these three positive feedback mechanisms, wherein perceived
cooperative norm violation leads to further cooperative norm violation, could act
simultaneously to result in a rapid downward spiral, leading to low levels of cooperation.
As Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren (1990) note, descriptive norms are informative as to adaptive
behavior. In a community with low levels of cooperation and minimal punishment of
cooperative norm violation, non-cooperative strategies may outperform others (Wilson
& Csikszentmihalyi, 2007). Other processes—prestige-biased (Henrich & Gil-White,
2001) or conformist (Henrich & Boyd, 1998) transmission and self-selection of people
with preferences for an antisocial community—could further reinforce uncooperative or
overtly antisocial strategies. While cooperative norms are considered a component of social
capital (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Bowles & Gintis, 2002), our results demonstrate the need
for explicit integration of cultural transmission and norm psychology—i.e., psychological
adaptations for determining and adopting local norms and punishing violators (Chudek
& Henrich, 2011)—with social disorganization theory. Scholars of criminology will note
some similarities between the social learning theory of deviance (Akers, 2009) and theories
of cultural transmission. However, we extend this bridge between the social environment
and individual behavior by emphasizing the feedback from the individual to the social
group. That is, we have outlined three routes by which an individual’s defection can lead
other individuals to adopt similar behavioral strategies, thus altering the local cultural
ecology (Camerer & Fehr, 2006).
Missing from this hypothesized downward spiral is an initial perturbation that could
result in an increase in cooperative norm violation (or perceived violation) in the
neighborhood. Poverty and economic uncertainty are also striking differences between
Neighborhoods A and B. Without middle class buffers of savings and credit, institutional
safety nets, or strong reciprocal networks, crises such as illness create the potential for
dire outcomes, thus altering the costs and benefits of defecting. For people already living
at the margin, material crises might result in a higher probability of defection. Especially
for crises that hit broad swaths of a community simultaneously, such as the widespread
job loss in Neighborhood B resulting from the collapse of the shipbuilding and coal
mining industries, one can imagine an increase in the frequency of defection that alters
the descriptive cooperative norms enough to start a downward spiral in defection.
Importantly, although we hypothesize that poverty and economic uncertainty were
linked to an initial perturbation of cooperative norm violation in the current study, the
positive feedback of norm violation could continue in the absence of poverty. There has
been debate as to whether there are direct, as well as indirect, effects of poverty and/or
income inequality on crime (Patterson, 1991; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993a; Bursik & Grasmick,
1993b). The story we have sketched is compatible with both possibilities, as an historical
direct effect of poverty on norm violation may lead to cultural dynamics that persist
beyond the duration of the poverty itself. (For a similar example of such cultural inertia,
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see Sah (1991), who argues that a transient change in the economics of crime can lead to
persistently high crime rates, due to a postulated relationship between higher crime rates
and decreased expectation of punishment.)
However, we can only speculate as to whether these dynamics are at play in Neighbor-
hood B (outside of the 3PP game) and to what extent they can explain the observed high
rates of crime and antisocial behavior.
This paper also makes contributions to empirical gaps in two fields. In Study 1, we
demonstrated that the covariation of cooperation and punishment of non-cooperation,
which has been observed cross-culturally with economic games (Henrich et al., 2006),
can extend to the local level. Participants in Neighborhood A stole less money and
were more punitive in the game than those in B. Also in Study 1, we demonstrated an
association—albeit small—between third-party punishment of antisocial behavior and
trust in one’s neighbors, as well as a neighborhood-level association between antisocial
behavior in the game and decreased third-party punishment of antisocial behavior.
These results provides additional, novel empirical support for the relationship between
(1) low social control and low social capital, and (2) low social control and high rates of
antisocial behavior. Data on actual social control (rather than the potential that residents
will engage in social control, as measured by survey data) are difficult to come by, limiting
the strength of the inference that low social capital and high rates of antisocial behavior
are correlated due to lack of social control (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993a; Bursik & Grasmick,
1993b; Steenbeck & Hipp, 2011).
We acknowledge that there are a number of limitations to our studies. We could not
control the order at which participants looked at or filled out packet components. It is
possible that participants ‘justified’ their behavior in the game with their questionnaire
answers. However, we might then expect a robust positive effect of value £1 on theft.
Presenting Player 1s with the threat of punishment for theft could have decreased intrinsic
motivation to behave cooperatively (Frey & Jegen, 2001), although it is unclear how this
would produce a spurious correlation between perceived cheating and theft in the game.
We cannot account for the neighborhood residents who chose not to respond, although
in both neighborhoods we likely reached a segment of the community biased towards
prosocial preferences (registered voters and research participants). Additionally, although
participants were anonymous to each other in the game, they were not anonymous to us.
The neighborhood differences in game behavior we observed could be partly attributed
to participants in Neighborhood A, but not Neighborhood B, regarding a university
professor as someone in their social milieu and thus being concerned about reputational
repercussions.
Finally, we have two related suggestions for future study that may increase our under-
standing of why some communities appear to be stuck at uncooperative equilibria, despite
concerted efforts by city planners to chart a different course (Robinson, 2005), or even
substantial temporal changes in the demographic makeup (Shaw & McKay, 1942). The
first is further investigation of the potential for multiple, simultaneous paths of positive
feedback on cooperative norm violation, including not just conditional cooperation but
Schroeder et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.450 19/23
also punitiveness and expectation of punishment. The second is consideration of how
psychological adaptations for recognizing and adopting local norms, as well as biased in-
and out-migration (Chudek & Henrich, 2011), can reinforce an antisocial culture.
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